Gary
I keep my father's old British Rail lamp on my kitchen windowsill in Three Bridges. He was a signalman on the London-Brighton line for thirty-two years, back when the government actually invested in transport infrastructure. When I was a kid, he'd point out the window at the tracks and tell me how they'd upgraded the whole line in the 1980s, new signals, better junctions, proper maintenance depots. "That's what happens when you decide something needs doing," he'd say. "You do it."
I thought that's how it still worked when I qualified as a civil engineer at Brighton University. I specialized in transport infrastructure because I believed in it. Good roads, reliable railways, properly designed junctions – they're not luxuries, they're the arteries that keep communities alive. I spent fifteen years working on motorway upgrades across the South East, watching schemes come together from the first survey pegs to the final road markings. It was satisfying work, the kind that makes a real difference to people's daily lives.
Then 2019 arrived and redundancy hit when my firm lost contracts during what everyone called "the spending cuts." I wasn't worried at first. I had experience, qualifications, contacts across the industry. More importantly, I knew there was work that needed doing. The A23 corridor through Crawley had been crying out for upgrades since I was a teenager. The Department for Transport had been discussing improvements since 2015, publishing reports about congestion hotspots and safety concerns. Surely they'd need qualified engineers to deliver those schemes.
I contacted the Department for Transport directly, explaining my background and offering my services for the A23 project. The civil servant I spoke to was polite but firm. "The Treasury has placed severe constraints on our capital spending programme," she told me. "We'd love to progress these infrastructure schemes, but we simply don't have the budget allocation." It sounded reasonable. Everyone knows government departments have limited budgets.
So I approached Highways England next, focusing on the M23 junction improvements that locals had been demanding for years. Traffic backs up there every morning, accidents happen regularly, it's exactly the kind of problem my experience was designed to solve. The project manager was sympathetic. "We'd love to progress these schemes," he said, "but there simply isn't the budget allocation from central government. Our hands are tied until Treasury releases more capital funding."
West Sussex County Council was my third attempt. Smaller transport projects, local road improvements, anything that would use my skills and address real problems in the area. The transport planning officer listened carefully to my proposals, nodding at the technical details. Then she delivered the same message with slight variations. "We've had our capital grant cut by 60 percent since 2010," she explained. "There's no funding for new infrastructure. We're struggling to maintain what we've already got."
Three institutions, three variations of the same phrase: "there is no funding." At first, I accepted it. It sounded like a fact, something beyond anyone's control. Budgets are budgets, money is money, you can't spend what you don't have. I decided to adapt, make myself more employable, ride out whatever financial crisis was preventing the obvious investments.
I enrolled at Crawley College to retrain in project management, adding new qualifications to my engineering background. The infrastructure course seemed perfect – exactly the combination of technical knowledge and organizational skills the industry claimed to need. But when I arrived for the first session, half the lecture hall was empty. Twenty places, nine students. The tutor, a former Highways Agency engineer himself, mentioned they used to run three cohorts a year. Now they barely filled one.
That's when I started seeing the contradictions. Walking back from college through Horley, I passed the old British Rail engineering works where my father had sometimes picked up overtime shifts. The depot was sitting empty, weeds growing through the tracks where hundreds of skilled workers once maintained rolling stock. The buildings were solid, the equipment bays still intact, but the gates were chained shut. A "To Let" sign from a commercial property agent had been weathered white by three winters of rain.
I stood there looking at those empty workshops and something clicked. The government that issues the pound sterling had told me it couldn't find enough pounds to train engineers or upgrade transport infrastructure. But here was a fully equipped training facility standing idle. At the college, qualified instructors were turning away potential students because course places were "unfunded." In my own street, three neighbors were out of work in construction trades – exactly the skills needed for road improvement projects.
If the people existed, and the buildings existed, and the skills could be taught, what exactly was it that "there was no money" for? The government that prints the notes and mints the coins was telling me it couldn't locate enough of them to connect unemployed engineers with infrastructure projects that everyone agreed were necessary. It started to sound less like an accounting problem and more like a choice wrapped in the language of impossibility.
I used to accept the excuse that "there was no money." I hear it differently now. The government that creates the currency told me it couldn't find enough of it to train the people who were standing right there, ready to work on projects that local communities desperately needed. The real question was never about money. It was about whether the people existed – they did. Whether the skills could be taught – they could. Whether the materials were available – they were.
The excuse wasn't a fact. It was a political decision dressed up as fiscal responsibility. It's the same logic as a household saying "we can't afford it," except households don't issue their own currency. The government does. The limit was never the money. The limit was the willingness to spend it into the places and people who needed it most.
Now I understand that what happened to me isn't just my story. It's the story of every constituency where skilled people and pressing needs exist side by side while someone in Westminster insists the cupboard is bare. The engineers are here. The projects are mapped. The materials are waiting in supply yards. What's missing isn't pounds sterling – it's the political will to deploy them where they're needed.
Logical Fallacy
What Gary experienced has a name.
Constructing an argument that sounds reasonable but contains a fundamental flaw in reasoning.
Every time someone told Gary "there is no money," they were applying household logic to a currency issuer. When your household runs low on pounds, you must earn or borrow more before you can spend them. When the UK government runs low on pounds, it creates them. That's what currency sovereignty means – the power to issue your own money rather than depend on someone else's.
The Treasury treated infrastructure spending like a family saving up for a kitchen extension, carefully counting existing pounds before committing to spend. But governments don't save up their own currency – they spend it into existence. The real constraint is never money but resources: do the engineers exist? Yes. Are the materials available? Yes. Can the work be done? Yes.
The resources existed. The people existed. The decision not to connect them was political, not financial.